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Alien Phenomenology, or What 
It’s Like to Be a Thing by Ian 
Bogost. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2012. Pp. 168. 
$60 cloth, $19.95 paper.
Jet Plane: How It Works by David 
Macaulay (with Sheila Keenan). 
New York: David Macaulay 
Studio, 2012. Pp. 32. $13.55 
library binding, $3.99 paper.
Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology 
of Things by Jane Bennett. 
Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2010. Pp. 200. $74.95 cloth, 
$20 paper.
Aircraft fairing, High-lift device, 
Vortex generator, Aft pressure bulk-
head, Ballute, Monocoque, Fuselage, 
Flight test  instrumentation, Drogue 
parachute, Empennage, NACA 
cowling, Accessory drive, Flight-
data acquisition unit, Wire strike 
protection system, Duramold, Air 
data boom, Skin, Arming plug, 
Auxiliary power unit, Airframe, 
M10 smoke tank, Air brake, 
Longeron.
Airbus A319 STL → PHX → 
LAS.
Well, don’t you look at me like life 
don’t hold you anymore mystery.
—Modest Mouse, “History Sticks 
to Your Feet” (2009)
The human experience of flight is 
thoroughly objective, driven, as it 
is, by the airplane as an object. But 
airplanes are not simply objects 
to which we, as subjects, attend. 
Airplanes lay claim on us, get their 
blades into us, and so modulate the 
way we think about and engage 
them. Broadly speaking, airplanes 
take part in how we think and 
talk about flight. They are objects 
that mediate our relationship with 
air, with gravity, and even with 
our own bodies. But airplanes are 
perhaps even more than this and 
for things other than us. What Ian 
Bogost argues with respect to com-
puters is equally applicable here: 
“[F]or [it] to operate at all for us first 
requires a wealth of interactions 
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to take place for itself”  (10). Jane 
Bennett resonates with Bogost in 
her insistence that things “act as 
quasi agents or forces with trajec-
tories, propensities, or tendencies 
of their own” (viii). Our critical 
engagements with flight must be 
about more than what Bennett calls 
demystification, which “presumes 
that at the heart of any event or 
process lies a human agency” (xiv).
What approaches such as 
Bogost’s and Bennett’s bring to crit-
ical air studies from their external 
vantage point is an insistence that in 
critically engaging flight we work 
not only to reveal, expose, or unveil 
the human in the cockpit, but also to 
find even more objects that enable 
both flight and our thinking of it. 
As Christopher Schaberg writes of 
what he calls “airport reading” in 
The Textual Life of Airports, “[T]his 
type of reading depends on the air-
port itself to have already emerged 
as a primary text of sorts, a legible 
space where there are . . . planes 
roaring into the air . . . (among 
many other informational signs, 
auditory cues, and aestheticized 
views).”1 To think about airplanes 
is to already be with airplanes.
In this short essay, I review 
Bogost’s Alien Phenomenology 
(2012) and Bennett’s Vibrant 
Matter (2010) alongside David 
Macaulay’s Jet Plane (2012), 
which is devoted to a child’s expe-
rience of airplanes. While com-
posed for different audiences in 
traditionally discrete contexts, all 
three books do critical, specula-
tive work in providing explicit 
articulations and implicit perfor-
mances of alternative ontologies 
from which critical air studies 
might benefit. Gathered around 
Jet Plane, Vibrant Matter, and 
Alien Phenomenology, we can get 
a taste of a speculative critical air 
studies: the philosophy of nondu-
alist ontologies and the politics 
of distributed, material assem-
blages. I begin with Bogost, move 
to Bennett, and conclude with a 
reading of Macaulay’s children’s 
book, which productively, if 
implicitly, performs the philoso-
phies of Bogost and Bennett.
Asking about “what it’s like 
to be a thing,” Bogost articulates 
other ways of doing philosophy 
while at the same time explicating 
his own unique strain of specu-
lative realism. Bogost places his 
work in media studies and com-
puter science in a line with object-
oriented philosophers Graham 
Harman and Levi Bryant and 
sociologist-turned-all-things-
for-all-people Bruno Latour. 
Primary for Bogost is the argu-
ment that “all things equally exist, 
yet they do not exist equally” (11, 
his  emphasis). This means simply 
that differences between humans 
and nonhumans are not ontologi-
cal, but specific. For instance, our 
human capacity for language does 
not quantitatively set apart our 
being from a toaster’s, but marks 
a (rather important)  qualitative 
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 distinction in our mode of being. 
The implications of this for phi-
losophy (Bogost’s field of deploy-
ment) are far-reaching. Of 
particular importance is Bogost’s 
argument that philosophers must 
walk the narrow path between 
a realism that treats all matter as 
inert (i.e., a billiard ball reality) 
and an idealism that reduces all 
matter to what humans have to 
say about it (i.e., social construc-
tionism). This troubling binary 
stems from the ontological distinc-
tion between humans and nonhu-
mans. Bogost’s alternative, strange 
realism acknowledges both that 
objects are more than we have to 
say about them and that their real-
ity is not something we can crack 
open and fully comprehend; this 
is neither idealism nor standard 
realism.
Flying this narrow path, Bogost 
proposes “[t]he act of wonder,” 
which “invites a detachment from 
ordinary logics, of which human 
logics are but one example” (124). 
Bogost means wonder in two 
senses: (a) “awe or marvel” and (b) 
“puzzlement or logical perplexity” 
(121). To wonder is to be drawn 
to objects, or what Bogost calls 
units (23), precisely by their abil-
ity to exceed our grasp. The work 
of wonder can take many forms, 
including ontography, metaphorism, 
and carpentry, the descriptions of 
which account for the bulk of his 
book. Ontography is the practice of 
ratcheting up logical perplexity to 
reveal the operations and relation-
ships of objects “without necessarily 
offering clarification or description 
of any kind” (38): “It shows how 
much rather than how little exists 
simultaneously” (59). Examples 
of ontography include Latourian 
litanies (38–40), visual ontographs 
(45–50), exploded views such as 
those found in instructional manu-
als and children’s books (50–52), 
and ontographic machines such as 
card games like In a Pickle (56–57). 
Ontography exposes the strange 
reality of all units by disrupting tra-
ditional human logics, which often 
work to simplify accounts of units.
In a similar vein, metaphorism is 
an attempt to understand nonhu-
man relations and operations that 
avoids the frequent reductionism 
of the scientific tradition. Whereas 
science is an attempt “to define 
the physical and causal relations 
between objects” (62, emphasis 
added), metaphorism operates by 
speculative analogy. Rather than 
making sense of how a bat relates 
to its environment by breaking 
down the components of its eye, 
which would get us no closer to 
seeing the world through them, 
metaphorism would argue that 
“the bat . . .  operates like a subma-
rine” (64). Bogost acknowledges 
that metaphorism can quickly 
become anthropomorphism in this 
regard; however, in the risk there 
is reward. Drawing on Bennett, 
Bogost argues that the very strange-
ness of the metaphor attends to the 
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difference between submarines 
and bats. Bats are not reduced by 
analogy but are actually made far 
stranger. Metaphorism, in this way, 
leads Bogost to carpentry, the prac-
tice of making things that do philo-
sophical work. Carpentry, Bogost 
writes, is “constructing artifacts 
that illustrate the perspectives of 
objects” (109). The sonar signals by 
which bats navigate could, via car-
pentry, be morphed into something 
akin to a heat map—wherein closer 
obstacles show up red and distant 
obstacles blue—that humans could 
then move in response to. Bogost’s 
carpentry, like his metaphorism, 
resonates with the work of Bennett.
Moving through vibrant matter, 
Bennett enacts both a philosophi-
cal and political project. Bennett, 
who, like Bogost, works with 
Latour, additionally pulls from the 
work of Baruch Spinoza, Henri 
Bergson, and Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari, especially the lat-
ters’ idea of assemblages. Bennett 
(whose area of deployment is politi-
cal  theory) argues that our political 
and philosophical work needs to 
attend to the agency of assemblages 
and the vibrancy of matter, which 
she describes as “thing-power.” 
Bennett explores the force of 
things, or what she calls actants, 
such as minerals ( chapter  4), 
fatty acids (chapter 3), stem cells 
( chapter  6), worms ( chapter 7), 
and electricity (chapter 2). In each 
chapter, Bennett advances her phil-
osophical project—by engaging 
a series of thinkers who have 
taken up stuff—and her politi-
cal  project—by engaging a spe-
cific piece of nonhuman stuff. For 
example, she writes extensively on 
the 2003 North American black-
out. Understanding the blackout as 
a vibrant assemblage requires that 
we neither boil it down to human 
motivations lurking beneath the 
behavior of electricity (e.g., the 
incompetence or greed of elec-
tric companies) nor pin it down 
conclusively via a reductionist 
realism (e.g., electricity has no voli-
tion). Bennett argues that we must 
address “the cascade of effects” 
that includes humans and nonhu-
mans. As she remarks in an earlier 
version of the chapter, “[e]lectric-
ity too contributed swerves and 
quirks.”2 Whereas Bogost’s project 
is squarely philosophical, Bennett’s 
project employs philosophy on the 
way to politics. “What difference 
would it make to the course of 
energy policy,” Bennett prods us to 
ask, “were electricity to be figured 
not simply as a resource, commod-
ity, or instrumentality but also and 
more radically as an ‘actant’?” (viii).
The stakes of any ontology are 
high: ignoring the thing-power 
of electricity or fatty acids bears 
on how we approach public prob-
lems such as energy and obesity. 
Working as she does from Latour, 
Bennett echoes him in calling “for 
people to imagine other roles for 
things besides that of carriers of 
necessity, or ‘plastic’ vehicles for 
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‘human ingenuity,’ or ‘a simple 
white screen to support the dif-
ferentiation of society’” (30–31). 
The vitalism of her vital mate-
rialism sees that vitality as “the 
capacity of things—edibles, com-
modities, storms, metals—not 
only to impede or block the will 
and designs of humans but also 
to act as quasi agents or forces 
with trajectories, propensities, or 
tendencies of their own” (viii). 
Bennett’s project asks us not to dig 
deep past the facades of objects, 
but to play with their surfaces to 
get at just how matter (or assem-
blages of matter) exerts agency 
and produces effects in the world. 
Taking matter at face value, “[w]e 
see how an animal, plant, mineral, 
or artifact can sometimes catalyze 
a public” (107). And there is more 
than just philosophical recognition 
at stake here: “[W]e might then 
see how to devise more effective 
(experimental) tactics for enhanc-
ing or weakening that public” 
(107). At stake in the philosophical 
recognition of matter as vibrant is 
the political necessity of activating 
such recognition. What a public 
(as an assemblage) is is not only 
human but nonhuman, as well.
Where Bogost raises the stakes 
for philosophy by crafting ways of 
engaging the nonhuman, Bennett 
doubles down on these stakes 
in attending to the political and 
ethical implications of nondualist 
ontologies: “I believe that encoun-
ters with lively matter can chasten 
my fantasies of human mastery, 
highlight the common material-
ity of all that is, expose the wider 
distribution of agency, and reshape 
the self and its interests” (122). In 
order to chasten such fantasies, 
Bennett’s project, like Bogost’s, 
calls for experimental tactics fueled 
by naiveté and wonder.
The look and feel of the chil-
dren’s book Jet Plane activates 
precisely this wonder in and 
engagement with airplanes as vital 
objects important in their own 
right (and not simply as means to 
an end). Jet Plane (as an exemplar 
of a rather robust genre) relates 
a childlike view of the mechan-
ics of flight that tends to leave us 
as we grow older, when airplanes 
become simply a mode of trans-
port. I review this book not only 
for how it speaks to children but 
also for how it speaks to us as 
scholars—as a work that engages 
in thoughtful philosophical and 
political work.
Jet Plane opens to the image of 
a child gazing out at an airplane 
approaching the terminal. We are 
looking at the airplane through the 
eyes of a child, and it is with these 
eyes that we should linger over 
airplanes. Bogost writes, “Our job 
is to go where everyone has gone 
before, but where few have both-
ered to linger” (34). But this linger-
ing, to which Jet Plane is devoted, 
is of a special quality, which Bogost 
describes as wonder. The linger-
ing of Jet Plane, then, isn’t mastery 
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experienced is a function of these 
(figure 1).
“A jet plane stands at the gate,” 
Macaulay opens the book (4). The 
jet plane is first an actant. This 
grammar of object agency is present 
throughout the book: “They [the 
pilots] are surrounded by instru-
ments and screens. These tell them 
everything” (9). Bennett’s argu-
ment hinges upon the acknowledg-
ment of this grammar: “[W]e are 
much better admitting that non-
humanity infects culture, for the 
latter entails the blasphemous idea 
that nonhumans—trash, bacteria, 
stem cells, food, metal, technolo-
gies, weather—are actant rather 
than objects” (115). As the child 
moves through the airplane, he is 
surrounded not by simple, inert 
objects, but actants that enable 
flight (figure 2).
Jet Plane fosters an acknowl-
edgment of object actancy, peering 
into the world of flight on a child’s 
behalf: cutaways, miniscule details, 
exploded views. This work does 
more than explain the airplane or 
reduce it to component parts, but 
rather exponentially increases the 
airplane’s strangeness and its air-
planeness. Airplanes are more puz-
zling when we linger over their 
minutiae. Jet Plane aims not at 
mastery or demystification but at 
intimacy. We are suspended in air 
by the slight curve of a wing. The 
sheer awe and puzzlement with 
which the child attends to the air-
plane opens up an entire world of 
but a mixture of “awe or marvel” 
and “puzzlement or logical per-
plexity” (121). This is the kind of 
lingering I’m promoting for criti-
cal air studies, and it is the kind of 
lingering we see performed in Jet 
Plane. This illustrated reader was 
written by David Macaulay (with 
Sheila Keenan), who is famous for 
his other books Castle (1982), City 
(1983), Underground (1983), and 
Mill (1989), which tell the stories of 
each of these places through nar-
rative and complex line drawings 
often sketched from impossible, 
nonhuman perspectives. These, 
too, are books of wonder, which 
fascinated me as a child and con-
tinue to fascinate my son and me. 
Macaulay’s books are composed in 
wonder in order to cultivate won-
der—to marvel at how much the 
world is full of and composed by 
strange, nonhuman matter.
Jet Plane is likewise narrative-
based. A child is moved through 
networks of flight: from the 
 terminal, through the gate, past the 
cockpit, into the cabin, away from 
the terminal, down the tarmac, up 
into the air, into the night, around 
a storm, down through the clouds, 
onto the runway, and back up to 
the gate. At each step, the part of 
the jet’s assemblage that makes 
such movement and experience 
possible is introduced: instruments 
and screens, air traffic control-
lers, engines, fuel, lift, drag, thrust, 
satellites, storms, landing gear, 
and grounds crew. What you have 
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Figure 1. Illustration from Jet Plane: How it Works. The wonder of a child as he lingers over 
the airplane’s wing through the airplane’s window—a view itself already shaped by the air-
plane. From Jet Plane: How It Works © 2012 by David Macaulay. Reprinted by permission 
of Roaring Brook Press. All rights reserved.
Figure 2. Illustration from Jet Plane: How it Works. A modified exploded view of an airplane 
turning to avoid a storm. As Bogost himself writes of children’s books, “[A] child pores over the 
cutaway view of a submarine . . . not to learn how to operate it but to fathom a small aspect 
of its murky otherworldliness” (52). Note the dropped cup of coffee feeling the effects of the 
turn. From Jet Plane: How it Works © 2012 by David Macaulay. Reprinted by permission of 
Roaring Brook Press. All rights reserved.
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objects and things. Bogost describes 
this kind of lingering as a job; for 
children, lingering is not a job but 
a pleasure-filled way of being in the 
world.
The payoff here is simple. In 
any critical engagement with 
flight, with air, we must attune 
ourselves to the vibrancy of air-
planes. Airplanes must be more 
than a means to an end and other 
than signifiers, representations, 
cultural artifacts, or containers for 
human interaction. What a chil-
dren’s book like Jet Plane does is 
to engage the airplane with an eye 
neither toward the reduction of 
scientific certainty nor the reduc-
tion of cultural significance, but 
with an eye toward wonder and 
enchantment, which are surely 
critical tasks, as well. Jet Plane 
wants to suck us into and expose 
us to airplanes in their strange 
reality. In this book, airplanes are 
things to linger on and with.
What I find additionally com-
pelling about such a speculative 
approach is the willful mixture of 
closeness and distance. It is a real-
ism born not of critical distance, the 
usual way one obtains objectivity, 
but born of a kind of puzzled prox-
imity from which things can then 
withdraw. Objectivity is an effect of 
intimacy rather than its opposite. 
The closer we get to airplanes, the 
stranger they become as an object. 
This strangeness, I’d wager, would 
serve well any critical engagement 
with flight. To inhabit an airplane 
as a child is to attend to the airplane 
as an active ingredient in the expe-
rience of air. It is the critical com-
portment of wonder and naiveté: to 
believe that an airplane will never 
fully divulge its secrets no matter 
how long or intently we peer at 
or through it or how ever long we 
sit in it. Flight does not need to be 
demystified.
Our understanding of flight 
is predicated upon our being in 
airplanes, which are not simply 
a part of the experience of flight, 
but a necessary condition for our 
experience of flight as such. We 
are attuned to the air by the air-
plane: when our ears pop, as we 
chew gum, as we breathe the air, 
as we taste the food, as turbulence 
jostles the plane and our confi-
dence in it, and as we take a cau-
tious peak into the air-sickness 
bag. We cannot abstract our expe-
rience of flight from our mate-
rial relations with airplanes. Our 
attitudes change with altitude. 
Designed by humans to be sure, 
but in response to any number of 
forces, human and nonhuman, 
airplanes are themselves an ongo-
ing negotiation among humans, 
gravity, rain, wind, clouds, elec-
tricity and fossil fuels: airplanes 
are diplomats. They are objects 
we both work with and are with. 
Bennett and Bogost articulate this 
explicitly; Macaulay performs it 
implicitly.
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